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CASE COMMENTS
doctor to be well informed about the subject in both treating and
testifying. Since an equal amount of knowledge of the injury is
necessary in either case, the New Mexico court echoed the other
contra cases in saying that they failed to see how any harm could
be done by the fact that the examination was not made for the
purpose of treatment. The fact that a man's viewpoint as to the
magnitude and grevousness of his injury can well shift when that
person seeks legal rather than medical relief was ignored or vitiated
by this court.
Regardless of the contra holdings, it is believed that the West
Virginia supreme court has reached a sound and meritorious deci-
sion in the principal case. Granted that the opposite parties in
litigation will still use physicians who are either liberal or conserva-
tive in answering hypothetical questions based primarily on the
plaintiff's alleged condition, still these questions must have a foun-
dation in facts in evidence in order for the jury to make a causal
connection between the injury and any answer to these questions,
and, therefore, the opportunity for fabricated or exaggerated claims
will be greatly lessened.
L. O. H.
INcomm TAx-FAno MA =c VALuE OF OvaxmiaNG RoYALTY
Imm -Impiam lRsEwxD EcoNomc INTEREsT.-Taxpayers sold
shares in one corporation for cash and an overriding royalty inter-
est. The cash received in excess of what the shares had cost was
declared on their return as capital gain. The amounts received
from this overriding royalty had for years after the sale been
declared as ordinary income by the taxpayers. They now seek a
refund on the basis that the income was not ordinary but was long
term capital gain. Held, the fact that they received the overriding
royalty interest as part of the sale price of the property is irrelevant.
Such an overriding royalty is a property interest, and therefore, the
question of whether it must have a fair market value need not be
considered. Income received by the owner of a property interest
is taxable to him as ordinary income rather than as a capital gain.
Warren v. United States, 171 F.Supp. 846 (1959).
Courts may generally treat the acquisition of an overriding
royalty by a vendor in a transaction in three distinct ways.
1. They may consider it as part of the entire consideration paid
to the vendor, and by reducing it to its fair market value, combine
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it with any other payment received to arrive at the whole of the
purchase price. This will close the transaction for tax purposes and
any amount later received, in excess of such fair market value, will
be taxed as ordinary income.
52. They may consider it as part of the purchase price but may
decide because of its contingent nature that it has no fair market
value. The whole consideration for the purchase could not then be
presently ascertained and the transaction would remain open for
tax purposes. Since capital gain or loss cannot be computed until
the amount realized on the sale is determined, each future payment
will be added to purchase price and once the vendor's basis is
recouped will be taxed as capital gain.
8. They may consider it as reservation or retention of an eco-
nomic interest by the vendor. Since he has never actually parted
with it, then it was not part of the sale and it continues to earn
income for the vendor the same as before the transaction and is
taxed in the same manner as ordinary income. The vendor need
not actually reserve this interest in the transaction whereby he
parted with all of his other interests in the land. The court may
imply it from the facts and circumstances of the case.
On first viewing this case there seems to be, in the majority
opinion, a new approach in determining what will constitute capital
gain derived from a sale of property, where part of the sale price
includes an overriding royalty interest. The general rule apparently
applicable here is found in INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 1001 (a),
which states that the gain from the sale or other disposition of prop-
erty shall be the excess of the amount realized over the adjusted
basis provided in section 1011. To determine the amount realized
from the sale or other disposition of the property, we must then
look to section 1001 (b), which states it shall be the sum of any
money received plus the fair market value of the property (other
than money) received. Fair market value was used in Treasury
Regulations to mean that if a person received for his services some-
thing for which there was no market, it could not be considered
income. Walls v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 847 (10th Cir. 1932).
It seems well established that before there is a taxable gain,
consideration must be received in cash or it must be readily reduci-
ble to cash. Bedell v. Commissioner, 30 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1929);
Salt Deposit & Trust Co. v. Miles, 273 F. 824 (D.Md. 1921). The
mere expectation of a profit will not give rise to a taxable transac-
tion; for the purposes of taxes, the gain must be realized. Lucas v.
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American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445 (1930); Lynch v. Turrish, 247
U.S. 221 (1918); O'Meara v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 390 (10th Cir.
1929).
A contingent promise has no fair market value and if it is
received as part of the sale price of other property, the transaction
will remain an open one for the purposes of taxation. If it has
ascertainable value, the transaction will be considered closed. Com-
missioner v. Carter, 170 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1948); Perry v. Commis-
sioner, 152 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1945).
It is an accepted proposition that a court may not consider a
transaction a closed one where the promise of payment is contingent
and where the value of the contract remains open until payments
are completed. Such a promise is in no proper sense equivalent to
cash and the taxpayer-promisee, might never recoup his capital
investment from payments conditionally promised. Burnet v. Logan,
288 U.S. 404 (1931). In a situation where the property interest has
no ascertainable fair market value when received, the only prac-
ticable and accurate method of measuring its value is by applica-
tion of the money to such valuation as it is received. Westover v.
Smith, 173 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1949). When a fair market value
cannot be determined, then the tax statute cannot be satisfied and
no tax can be imposed in the immediate transfer. Propper v. Com-
missioner, 89 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1987).
Where there is a contingent promise, until the sellor's capital
investment is returned, it cannot be determined if gain or loss will
result from the sale; therefore, if it becomes certain that future pay-
ments will result in gain, there is no apparent reason for taxing them
as ordinary income. Commissioner v. Carter, 170 F.2d 911 (2d Cir.
1948).
On the basis of the above stated cases, if the court interpreted
the instant transaction as a sale whereby the seller had conveyed all
of the property interests involved and had received a contingent
promise in the form of an overriding royalty as part payment, then
the court would appear to be departing from the norm by its deci-
sion in refusing to consider the fair market value. On the other
hand, a different opinion of the decision might be reached if the
court did not treat the transaction as a sale.
The principal case does not mention an actual reservation of
interest in the conveyance between the taxpayer and the buyer of
the stock. However, it is not necessary that this reservation be ex-
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pressed because, 'WVhether an agreement of purchase and sale has
conveyed all of the property interests involved so as to make the
purchaser fully taxable on all of the resultant earnings or whether
the contract has reserved an interest in the seller on which the
seller is taxable is a question of the intent of the parties in making
the agreement. This intent may be inferred from the wording of
the agreement and from the surrounding circumstances." Vermont
Transit Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1955).
Where the vendor retains a mineral royalty from land sold, it
will constitute an economic interest in the land and requires treat-
ment of his income from it as royalties taxable as ordinary income
and not as purchase money payments taxable as capital gain.
Hamme v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1953).
If a conveyance provides that the vendor is selling his property
in consideration of a cash payment and future royalty payments,
then it is not a sale but a leasing arrangement and the payments
received thereunder are taxable as ordinary income and not as
capital gain. Hamme v. Commissioner, supra; McLean v. Com-
missioner, 120 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1941).
There seems to be no doubt that the decision of the court was
just and correct. The only problem that presents itself to this
writer is why the court spent so much of its time trying to justify
its refusal to consider fair market value of the overriding royalty
interest when, to begin with, the transaction was not a sale. If the
court did not intend to imply the reservation of economic interests
to this case and meant to treat it as a sale, then its decision, though
good, is seemingly not based on well established authority but
appears to be a minority ruling.
M. J. F.
INcomm TAx-Loss INCMENT TO "SALE" INVOLVING OIL AND GAS
PRODucIoN PAYMENT-DEDuCroN ALLowED.-A, taxpayer and
sole transferee of X oil company, assigned to B developed lease-
holds and tangible assets with an adjusted basis of 832,500 dollars,
for a co--nideratiii -of 250,000 dollars, and specifically reserved a
pirbduction payment in eighty-five per cent of the working interest
in the property. This exception was to terminate when A had
received a sum of 3,600,000 dollars plus taxes and interest, the
payment to be contingent upon production. A subsequently as-
signed the production payment to C for 3,600,000 dollars. X corn-
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